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Over the last twenty years, the concept of time inconsistency has emerged as a 
central theme in behavioral economics, one that has begun to influence thinking 
concerning public policy.1 As is well-known, any consumer sufficiently self-aware 
(“sophisticated”) to notice her time-inconsistent tendencies will manifest a demand 
for commitment technologies. It is often assumed that consumers will acquire such 
self-awareness in the context of frequently repeated activities for which they 
consistently fail to follow through on prior intentions. Yet oddly, there is 
surprisingly little evidence that people actually value and exploit commitment 
opportunities. Most of the pertinent literature echoes this evaluation. For example, 
Gine, Karlan, and Zinman (2010) write that “there is little field evidence on the 
demand for or effectiveness of such commitment devices” (see also the excellent 
surveys by Bryan, Roizen, and Kerr, 2010, and DellaVigna, 2009). A collection of 
relatively recent papers has begun to fill that gap: see in particular Ariely and 
Wertenbroch (2002) on homework assignments, Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin (2006) 
and Beshears et al. (2015) on commitment savings devices, and Kaur, Kramer, and 
Mullainathan (2015) on incentive schemes. Still, nagging doubts persist, partly 
because the evidence is limited to particular decision contexts, and partly because 
much of it is equivocal. For example, the demand for commitment savings products 
in developing countries is potentially attributable to other-control (i.e., family and 
friends) rather than to self-control; see, e.g., Dupas and Robinson (2013). Skeptics 
continue to wonder why, if sophisticated time inconsistency is so prevalent, the 
market and regulators provide so few commitment devices, and unambiguous 
examples of costly commitments in the field are so difficult to find. Indeed, some 
suggest that the fewness of the obvious exceptions proves the rule.  
The consumption of addictive substances is often offered as a leading example 
of time inconsistency. Becker and Murphy (1988) have shown that a consumer with 
 
1
 Examples of policy applications include Laibson (1997, 1998), Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman (1998), Krussell, 
Kuruscu, and Smith (2000), Diamond and Koszegi (2003), Thaler and Benartzi (2004), Bernheim and Rangel (2004), 
Amador, Werning, and Angeletos (2006), Fang and Silverman (2009), Banerjee and Mullainathan (2010), Bernheim, Ray, 
and Yeltekin (2013), and many others.  
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time-consistent preferences could exhibit many of the choice patterns associated 
with such substances. However, unlike behavioral theories of addiction that posit 
sophisticated time inconsistency based on quasi-hyperbolic discounting (Gruber 
and Koszegi, 2001), cue-triggered visceral modes (Bernheim and Rangel, 2004), or 
temptation preferences (Gul and Pesendorfer, 2007), the Becker-Murphy model 
does not imply a demand for commitment. Despite the centrality of this implication, 
evidence that users of addictive substances actually value commitment 
opportunities is almost entirely limited to anecdotes. An important recent exception 
is Gine, Karlan, and Zinman (2010), who study the use of a commitment device for 
smoking cessation, but the general lessons to be drawn from their experiment are 
unclear.2 Without more systematic and extensive evidence, it is impossible to know 
whether the anecdotes pertain to commonplace or exceptional modes of behavior. 
Some evidence from clinical practice actually casts a degree of doubt on the 
hypothesis that addicts value commitment opportunities. For example, alcoholics 
can commit to sobriety by taking disulfiram, a drug that produces an unpleasant 
reaction to alcohol. However, only supervised disulfiram administration is 
generally recognized as effective; compliance is poor among patients who are given 
the drug to take on their own (see, e.g., Hughes and Cook, 1997, and Anton, 2001). 
Of course, an alcoholic who uses disulfiram runs the risk that he will give in to 
cravings and experience an extremely unpleasant reaction. Poor compliance may 
be attributable to this risk rather than to the absence of a demand for commitment 
more generally.  
A simple method for exercising self-control is to limit the availability of a 
problematic good by not maintaining an easily accessed supply. For example, 
dieters are counseled against keeping fattening foods at home, while smokers and 
 
2
 Subjects were offered the opportunity to post a bond, the principle of which was forfeited to a charity if they failed a 
urine test after six months. The take-up rate was 11 percent. One interpretation of this figure is that it reflects a limited 
demand for commitment devices (or at least for this particular commitment device), especially inasmuch as generosity or a 
desire to signal generosity toward the charity may have artificially inflated the take-up rate. (In this regard, it is worth noting 
that two-thirds of those who participated continued to smoke.) An alternative interpretation is that 11 percent is high in light 
of the contract's novelty, and indicates a strong latent demand for commitment devices. In a more recent study of smoking 
cessation (Halpern et al., 2015), the take-up rate for a related commitment device was similar (13.7 percent). 
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alcoholics who wish to quit or at least control their habits are often given similar 
advice. The National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism (a division of the 
National Institutes of Health) maintains a website called “Rethinking Drinking,” on 
which it offers “Tips to Try” for those who have not decided to give up alcohol 
entirely but want to cut down; see NIAAA (2012). It recommends that “[i]f drinking 
at home is a problem, keep little or no alcohol there.” This recommendation is 
echoed in many other self-help resources. 
We will refer to this self-control technique as the availability strategy. Notice 
that it involves a partial commitment: while it does not prevent an individual from 
obtaining the good in question, it restricts future opportunities in a way that makes 
the targeted behavior less convenient. When enumerating popular commitment 
devices, economists regularly cite the use of the availability strategy to control 
alcohol consumption. According to Schelling (1988), the strategy is to “[r]emove 
the mischievous resources: don’t keep liquor, or sleeping pills, in the house.” 
Likewise, Bryan, Karlan, and Nelson (2010) describe a handful of techniques to 
illustrate “ad hoc commitment devices,” which includes “not keeping alcohol in the 
house.”  
In this paper, we look for evidence that consumers actually employ the 
availability strategy to control their liquor consumption. We exploit a collection of 
state-level policy changes that altered the hours during which consumers can 
purchase liquor on Sundays (so-called “blue laws”). Someone who attempts to 
control liquor consumption by keeping no liquor at home will have greater success 
(at least on Sundays) in a regime with strict blue laws. Thus, under the hypothesis 
that the availability strategy is prevalent, a relaxation of blue laws should lead to a 
noticeable increase in liquor consumption. Of course, the same implication follows 
even if consumers have no interest in making commitments: assuming (plausibly) 
that liquor is complementary to restaurant meals and socializing at bars, then those 
who like to dine out and/or socialize on Sundays will consume less liquor in a 
regime with stringent blue laws. Thus, the mere fact that blue laws reduce liquor 
consumption – a proposition that already has some support in the literature (see 
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Section I) – cannot discriminate between the hypotheses of interest. A more 
discerning test is needed. 
A critical feature of our analysis is that it distinguishes between restrictions on 
off-premise liquor sales (through liquor and package stores) and on-premise sales 
(in restaurants and bars). For a practitioner of the availability strategy, both types 
of restrictions make the acquisition of alcohol significantly more difficult when 
none is kept at home; hence both should reduce liquor consumption. In contrast, 
time-consistent and naively time-inconsistent consumers should respond to off-
premise restrictions by carrying “inventories.” Sunday off-premise sales 
restrictions could affect liquor consumption among such consumers only if they are 
forgetful, the costs of carrying inventories are large, or (in the case of naive time 
inconsistency) they find themselves without inventories due to procrastination. 
Thus, models of time-consistent or naively time-inconsistent consumption can 
easily account for the absence of a relationship between liquor consumption and 
off-premise sales restrictions (indeed, we take this to be the most natural implication 
of time consistency). These same models have different implications for on-
premise sales restrictions because alcohol in bars and restaurants is not storable 
(consumers cannot hold inventories), and consumers are not completely indifferent 
with respect to going out on different days of the week. 
We investigate these issues by examining the effects on annual state-wide liquor 
purchases of changes in state laws defining allowable Sunday hours for liquor sales. 
We focus on liquor rather than wine or beer for two reasons. First, sales restrictions 
are generally simpler and easier to code for liquor than for beer and wine. For 
instance, many states have historically carved out exemptions for certain types of 
wine and beer based on alcohol content. Second, there is evidence that the self-
control problems commonly associated with alcohol consumption are most 
prevalent for liquor (see, for example, Roizen et al. 1999, or Kerr et al., 2002). We 
examine 32 changes in allowable off-premise hours and 46 changes in allowable 
on-premise hours occurring between 1970 and 2007; in 22 of these cases, states 
changed both limits during the same year. We estimate panel regressions with state 
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fixed effects (to control for unobserved differences in attitudes toward alcohol that 
may affect both regulations and consumption) and year effects (to control for 
general trends in liquor consumption over time). Thus, we identify the effects of 
restrictions on allowable Sunday sales hours by, in effect, comparing the changes 
over time in liquor purchases for states that modified their regulations to the 
changes for states that did not. We address some threats to our identification 
strategy below. 
Our central finding is that liquor consumption increases along with allowable on-
premise Sunday sales hours, but there is no evidence that it is affected by off-
premise Sunday sales hours. These findings are robust with respect to a wide variety 
of specifications, including ones that control for pre-existing trends and concurrent 
changes in related restrictions. Thus, to our considerable surprise, we find no 
indication that the availability strategy plays a meaningful role in aggregate liquor 
consumption. Instead, the observed pattern coincides with our prediction for time-
consistent consumers who have good memories and low costs of carrying 
inventories, as well as for naive time-inconsistent consumers who, in addition, do 
not regularly find themselves without inventories due to unintentional 
procrastination of shopping. Naturally, the possibility remains that liquor 
purchasers are time-inconsistent and sophisticated, but that they favor some other 
technique for exercising self-control. For instance, Bernheim, Ray, and Yeltekin 
(2015) demonstrate that a sophisticated time-inconsistent consumer may avoid 
external commitments because they undermine internal self-control strategies. 
In addition to shedding light on the demand for commitment devices, our analysis 
also has direct implications for tax policy. Over the last few decades, many states 
have repealed or relaxed blue laws in an attempt to increase tax revenues. The 
efficacy of these measures is controversial. For example, an article in the New York 
Times cited projections that permitting Sunday sales would increase tax revenues 
in Georgia, but also referenced unnamed analysts who “are less certain that [this 
step] will bring in much new money because drinkers are likely simply to shift the 
days they buy alcohol” (Severson, 2011). Our analysis informs that debate by 
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showing that relaxing restrictions for on-premise sales is likely to increase revenue, 
but doing so for off-premise sales is not. 
I. Relation to the Existing Literature on the Effects of Blue Laws 
There is a small but growing literature concerning the effects of blue laws on the 
consumption of alcohol and alcohol-related behaviors. However, that literature has 
not explored the implications of those effects regarding time-inconsistency and the 
demand for commitment technologies, or estimated the effects in a way that permits 
one to draw those implications. 
Several studies have estimated the impact of blue laws on alcohol consumption. 
Ornstein and Hanssens (1985) evaluate the effects of several alcohol control 
measures using a state-level cross-section. They include a dummy variable 
indicating whether a state allows off-premise Sunday sales and find a positive and 
statistically significant relationship for beer but an implausible negative (and 
statistically significant) relationship for liquor. Stehr (2007) uses panel data to 
estimate the effects of alcohol taxes and Sunday restrictions on off-premise alcohol 
sales;3 he finds that liquor consumption increases by 3 to 7 percent when a Sunday 
off-premise ban is repealed. Carpenter and Eisenberg (2010) provide cross-
sectional evidence for Canadian provinces, and study changes in the drinking habits 
of Ontario residents after that province repealed its Sunday ban on off-premise sales 
in 1997. Based on survey data, they find an increase in drinking on Sundays coupled 
with a decline on Saturdays, and “no evidence that these policies affected overall 
population drinking rates.”  
Two considerations prevent one from drawing implications concerning the 
demand for commitment devices from the aforementioned studies. First, cross-
sectional evidence on the effects of blue laws (e.g., Ornstein and Hanssen, 1985, 
and much of Carpenter and Eisenberg, 2010) is suspect due to the likelihood that 
 
3
 Stehr’s paper does not explicitly mention whether the changes he examines pertain to off-premise or on-premise sales. 
He clarified this issue for us through a personal communication. 
8 
 
unobserved differences in attitudes toward alcohol affect both regulations and 
consumption. Second, none of these studies explicitly controls for restrictions 
pertaining to on-premise alcohol sales. In our sample, the correlation between 
allowable on-premise and off-premise Sunday sales hours is 0.57, and states 
changed both limits in the same year 22 times, which represents 69 percent of the 
changes in allowable off-premise hours, and 48 percent of the changes in allowable 
on-premise hours. Thus, the effects measured by the aforementioned studies 
(whether in cross-sections or panel data) likely reflect the blended impact of off-
premise and on-premise restrictions. While this consideration is not especially 
problematic for their purposes, it is fatal for ours (because we are concerned with 
the differential impact of off-premise and on-premise restrictions). The one 
exception is Carpenter and Eisenberg’s analysis of Ontario’s 1997 liberalization; as 
far as we can determine, Ontario did not alter on-premise restrictions on alcohol 
sales at the same time. However, that evidence is limited to a single policy change; 
consequently, all statements concerning statistical significance presuppose the 
absence of any common unobserved shocks to alcohol consumption across Ontario 
residents. 
We also depart from the aforementioned literature by studying the effects of 
allowable hours rather than outright bans. Information on bans is far more readily 
available than data on allowable hours. We undertook the time-consuming process 
of collecting the latter information because it permits us to employ richer 
characterizations of each state’s policies, and because it enables us to study the 
effects of a much larger set of legislative events. 
In principle, one can also draw inferences concerning the effects of blue laws on 
alcohol consumption indirectly from studies that examine alcohol-related activity 
– specifically, traffic accidents and crime. McMillan and Lapham (2006) found that 
repealing the ban on off-premise Sunday alcohol sales in New Mexico led to a 29 
percent increase in alcohol-related traffic accidents and a 42 percent increase in 
alcohol-related traffic fatalities. Similarly, Ligon and Thyer (1993) found that a 
Sunday sales ban on alcohol reduced the incidence of DUIs. Smith (1990) reports 
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on a handful of studies concerning alcohol policy changes in Australia; generally, 
he finds a positive relationship between increased Sunday alcohol sales and traffic 
accidents. Olsson and Wikstrom (1982) note that alcohol sales fell by 8 percent 
during an experimental period in 1981 when Swedish liquor stores were closed on 
Saturdays, with accompanying declines in domestic disturbances and arrests for 
drunkenness; however, they are careful to point out that causality is unclear because 
the experiment was nationwide. Other recent studies have found much more limited 
effects. Stehr (2010) examines changes in Sunday off-premise sales bans in a 
number of states and finds an increase in traffic fatalities only for New Mexico. 
Using similar data, Lovenheim and Steefel (2010) conclude that “blue laws have 
little effect on fatal accidents.” Finally, a recent paper by Heaton (2012) showed 
that crime increased somewhat along with the phased introduction of Sunday 
package liquor sales in Virginia. Like the studies of alcohol consumption 
mentioned above, most of these analyses shed limited light on the questions 
motivating our investigation because they make no explicit attempt to differentiate 
between the effects of on-premise and off-premise sales, and/or concern single 
policy changes. One must also exercise caution in drawing conclusions about 
alcohol consumption from alcohol-related activity; for example, the absence of a 
statistically significant effect on traffic accidents or crime would not necessarily 
imply the absence of a statistically significant effect on consumption. Moreover, 
for changes in recorded alcohol-related crimes, associated changes in reporting 
and/or enforcement may create confounds. For example, an officer may be more 
likely to record the presence of alcohol when writing up a Sunday crime if a ban is 
in place, and police departments may react to the relaxation of sales restrictions by 
setting more traps for drunk drivers. 
The current paper is also related to recent work by Hinnosaar (2012), who 
estimates the effect of a ban on Sunday beer sales indirectly, rather than from 
studying actual policy changes. Using scanner data on beer purchases, she derives 
an estimate of the fraction of consumers who have time-inconsistent preferences, 
and then uses that model to simulate the effects of a Sunday ban under the 
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assumption that those consumers would employ the availability strategy. Her work 
is complementary to ours, in that we examine actual policy changes and determine 
whether behavioral responses are consistent with commitment behavior. 
II. Theoretical Considerations 
A. A simple model of off-premises alcohol consumption 
A simple theoretical model helps to illuminate the circumstances in which people 
may attempt to exercise self-control over off-premises alcohol consumption by 
limiting readily available supplies. For simplicity, the model has only three time 
periods, 𝑡 = 0,1,2. Decisions unfold as follows. 
At time 0, the consumer has a convenient opportunity to purchase one unit of 
alcohol. By “convenient,” we mean that he shops at time 0 for other reasons, so that 
the incremental cost of buying alcohol is limited to its price, C. For simplicity, no 
consumption occurs at time 0, but any alcohol purchases are costlessly storable. 
At time 1, the consumer decides whether or not to drink a unit of alcohol. The 
immediate utility benefit of doing so is 𝐵. (For simplicity, we express all utility 
benefits and penalties, including B, as dollar equivalents.) If he has purchased and 
stored alcohol at time 0, consumption involves no other immediate costs. If he has 
no supply at home, he can make a separate trip to buy some at the price C, but also 
incurs an immediate utility penalty, 𝑇, as a result of the inconvenience.   
Time 2 represents the future, during which various costs are incurred. We will 
use H to denote the future penalty associated with consuming alcohol, including for 
example its adverse effect on health. The future penalty associated with purchasing 
alcohol is, of course, C, its price. We characterize this as a future penalty rather 
than a current one because spending money on alcohol requires an offsetting 
reduction in other spending, but not immediately.   
In addition, if the consumer purchased alcohol at time 0 and did not drink it at 
time 1, he will receive some additional benefit from owning alcohol at time 2.  
Instead of deriving that value in the context of a full dynamic programming model, 
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we simplify by assuming that the consumer must hold a unit of alcohol at the end 
of this period. Consequently, if he does not carry stock into period 2, he must 
purchase it at the cost 𝐶. He does so when shopping for other reasons, so that the 
inconvenience cost 𝑇 is avoided. Alternatively, one could assume that the consumer 
can sell any stock he owns as of time 2; the results are the same. 
Following much of the literature on time inconsistency (for example, Laibson, 
1997, 1998, and O'Donoghue and Rabin, 1999), we assume the consumer has quasi-
hyperbolic preferences: he discounts utility 𝑡 periods in the future by the factor 𝛽𝛿𝑡, 
where 𝛽, 𝛿 ∈ [0,1]. For our purposes, 𝛽 is the parameter of interest because it 
governs the degree of time inconsistency. For notational simplicity, we will assume 
𝛿 = 1. Inasmuch as we think of periods 0 and 1 as single days, this is a reasonable 
assumption. It is also without loss of generality because we can treat the parameters 
B, C, T, and H as already incorporating 𝛿-discounting. 
Accordingly, the consumer always maximizes the difference between immediate 
benefits and costs, plus a factor 𝛽 ∈ [0,1] times the difference between future 
benefits and costs. Note that 𝛽 matters only at time 1: at time 0, he makes a decision 
but faces no immediate consequences, while at time 2, he makes no decision. We 
assume that the value of 𝛽 applicable at time 1 is realized at the outset of that period, 
and that its distribution is governed by 𝐹, a CDF with support [𝛽, 𝛽]. We treat 𝛽 as 
random on the grounds that the severity of self-control problems depends on 
environmental cues that the consumer may or may not encounter, as in Bernheim 
and Rangel [2004].   
We classify the consumer as potentially time-inconsistent with respect to alcohol 
if his use of alcohol at time 1 could depend on the timing of his decision (i.e., 
whether he makes the choice at time 0 or time 1). Conversely, we classify him as 
time-consistent with respect to alcohol if his use of alcohol at time 1 definitely does 
not depend on the timing of his decision. Note that 𝛽 = 1 is a sufficient condition 
for time-consistency with respect to alcohol, but it is not a necessary condition. We 
will assume for the moment that the consumer is potentially time-inconsistent with 
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respect to alcohol, which requires 𝐵 − 𝐶 − 𝐻 < 0, so that as of time 0 he wishes to 
avoid drinking at time 1, and 𝐵 − 𝛽(𝐶 + 𝐻) > 0, so that as of time 1 he may wish 
to drink at time 1.  
B. The effect of a Sunday sales ban on off-premises alcohol sales 
Period 1 is the point in time at which sales restrictions on alcohol may apply – in 
other words, it represents “Sunday.” At the outset, we will assume that no such 
restrictions are in place, and examine the consumer’s decisions. 
If the consumer holds a unit of alcohol at time 1, he will drink it as long as 𝐵 ≥
𝛽(𝐶 + 𝐻). Consequently, assuming he is sophisticated, his expected utility 
conditional upon purchasing a unit at time 0, from the perspective of time 0, is: 
𝑈𝑃 = 𝛽 [𝐹 (
𝐵
𝐶+𝐻
) (𝐵 − 𝐶 − 𝐻) − 𝐶]. 
In contrast, if he does not hold a unit at time 1, he will purchase one and drink it 
as long as 𝐵 − 𝑇 ≥ 𝛽(𝐶 + 𝐻). Because he ends up purchasing alcohol at time 2 
regardless of whether he consumes at time 1, his expected utility conditional upon 
not purchasing a unit at time 0, from the perspective of time 0, is: 
𝑈𝑁𝑃 = 𝛽 [𝐹 (
𝐵−𝑇
𝐶+𝐻
) (𝐵 − 𝐶 − 𝐻 − 𝑇) − 𝐶]. 
A sophisticated consumer controls alcohol consumption by keeping no easily 
accessible supplies iff 𝑈𝑃 ≤ 𝑈𝑁𝑃 (resolving indifference in favor of no purchase), 
or equivalently 
1 +
𝑇
𝐶+𝐻−𝐵
≤ 𝐹( 𝐵
𝐶+𝐻
) 𝐹(𝐵−𝑇
𝐶+𝐻
)⁄ . 
Notice that refraining from purchasing alcohol at time 0 reduces total expected 
purchases from 1 + 𝐹( 𝐵
𝐶+𝐻
) to 1 + 𝐹(𝐵−𝑇
𝐶+𝐻
).  
Depending on the values of the model’s parameters, a sophisticated consumer 
may or may not choose to maintain a readily available supply. For instance, if 
𝐹(𝐵−𝑇
𝐶+𝐻
) = 0 (but 𝐹( 𝐵
𝐶+𝐻
) > 0), so that the absence of readily available supply 
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definitely deters drinking, we necessarily have 𝑈𝑃 < 𝑈𝑁𝑃, which means the 
consumer buys nothing at time 0. On the other hand, if 𝐹(𝐵−𝑇
𝐶+𝐻
) = 1 (which implies 
𝐹( 𝐵
𝐶+𝐻
) = 1), the consumer drinks regardless of whether he maintains a supply at 
home, so 𝑈𝑃 > 𝑈𝑁𝑃; in other words, it is optimal to avoid the costs of 
inconvenience by stocking up in advance. 
Now imagine that a law prevents sales of alcohol at time 1 (“Sunday”). Assuming 
the consumer stocks up at time 0, his outcome is unchanged: we have 𝑈𝑃
𝐵 = 𝑈𝑃 
(where the superscript 𝐵 denotes an outcome with a ban). However, if he fails to 
stock up, he can consume nothing at time 1, and hence his payoff is simply 𝑈𝑁𝑃
𝐵 =
−𝛽𝐶. Because 𝐵 − 𝐶 − 𝐻 < 0, we have 𝑈𝑃
𝐵 < 𝑈𝑁𝑃
𝐵 , so he is unambiguously better 
off purchasing nothing at time 0. Consequently, his overall expected purchases fall 
to unity, irrespective of the parameters. 
According to the preceding analysis, a Sunday ban on liquor sales reduces off-
premises purchases for two distinct reasons. First, it increases the effectiveness of 
the availability strategy conditional upon its use (the “efficacy channel”). To 
understand why this is the case, notice that 1 + 𝐹(𝐵−𝑇
𝐶+𝐻
) > 1. Second, as a 
consequence of this increased effectiveness, a sales ban also enlarges the set of 
individuals who attempt to employ the availability strategy (the “usage channel”). 
There are, of course, special conditions under which a Sunday ban has no effect 
on aggregate liquor purchases despite consumers’ use of the availability strategy. 
First, without a ban, the availability strategy must be perfectly effective for all those 
who use it. This requires 𝐹(𝐵−𝑇
𝐶+𝐻
) = 0, so that the individual would not make a 
special trip to the store to purchase liquor under any circumstances. Second, again 
without a ban, there must be no “marginal” consumers for whom the net benefits 
of the availability strategy are not quite sufficient to justify its use. The first 
condition disables the efficacy channel, while the second disables the usage 
channel. We regard these conditions as highly unrealistic in light of other 
considerations. First, alcohol consumption is notoriously difficult to self-regulate, 
and the clinical literature implies that simple self-control strategies are far from 
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perfect (see, e.g., Collins, 1993). Second, it is difficult to imagine a plausible 
distribution of underlying characteristics for which the alcohol-consuming 
population would divide between those who use and do not use the availability 
strategy while leaving no one on the margin. 
Critically, our conclusion concerning the effect of a Sunday sales ban hinges on 
the assumption that the consumer is potentially time-inconsistent with respect to 
alcohol. For if 𝐵 − 𝛽(𝐶 + 𝐻) < 0, he would purchase no alcohol under any 
circumstances, and if 𝐵 − 𝐶 − 𝐻 > 0, he would always stock up on alcohol at time 
0 to avoid the consequences of running out. It also hinges on the assumption that 
the consumer is at least somewhat sophisticated. It is easy to check that that same 
analysis goes through for a partially sophisticated consumer who incorrectly 
believes the distribution of 𝛽 to be ?̃? rather than 𝐹, with the exception that ?̃? 
replaces 𝐹 in expressions governing period 0 decisions; see, for example, 
O'Donoghue and Rabin (2001), DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004), and Bernheim, 
Fradkin, and Popov (2015) for formulations of partial naivete. However, a 
completely naive time-inconsistent consumer would behave just like a time-
consistent one in period 0.4 Thus, interpreted strictly through the lens of our simple 
model, the degree to which a ban on Sunday off-premise sales reduces overall 
alcohol consumption provides a gauge of the extent to which consumers exercise 
self-control through the availability strategy as a consequence of partially or fully 
sophisticated time inconsistency. 
Stepping outside of our simple model, a Sunday ban could reduce alcohol by 
time-consistent or naively time-inconsistent consumers if they face significant 
inventory-holding costs, typically incur lower inconvenience costs on Sundays than 
on other days, sometimes inadvertently forget to stock up, or (in the case of naive 
time inconsistency) periodically find themselves without supplies due to 
 
4
 Technically, a naive time-inconsistent consumer would be indifferent about purchasing alcohol in period 0. Those who 
resolve that indifference in favor of no purchase would effectively implement the availability strategy unintentionally, and 
consequently a Sunday sales ban would reduce their total consumption. That said, if we added some uncertainty with respect 
to 𝐵, so that 𝐵 > 𝐶 + 𝐻 in at least some states of nature (however unlikely), the naive consumer would strictly favor stocking 
up in advance, and a Sunday sales ban would have no effect. 
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unforeseen procrastination of shopping trips. Thus, strictly speaking, a finding that 
Sunday sales hours significantly affect liquor consumption would not rule out either 
time consistency or naivete. However, we question whether these consideration 
could plausibly account for large effects. For example, the costs of holding 
inventories appear to be minor; moreover, consumers who regularly drink liquor 
(and who therefore account for the bulk of sales) are likely to learn from experience 
and develop habits that help them avoid inadvertent depletion of supplies. More 
importantly, because these considerations would amplify rather than offset the 
effects of the availability strategy, a finding that liquor consumption is unaffected 
by Sunday off-premises sales hours would remain inconsistent with the hypothesis 
that significant numbers of consumers employ that strategy. 
C. Some extensions 
Up to this point, we have assumed that a ban on “Sunday” off-premise sales 
makes alcohol unavailable, or equivalently that it increases the value of 𝑇 by a large 
(prohibitive) amount. In fact, consumers may be able to obtain alcohol on Sundays 
at a higher but nonprohibitive cost by going to a bar or restaurant, in which case a 
ban effectively increases 𝑇 by some smaller amount.5 Strictly speaking, the effect 
of a small increase in 𝑇 on total alcohol consumption is theoretically ambiguous: 
conditional on refraining from purchasing alcohol at time 0, consumption declines 
(because the effective price rises), but more people could end up purchasing alcohol 
at time 0 (for example, if they know they would otherwise likely incur the higher 
costs of going to a bar). The latter possibility strikes us as rather perverse: it requires 
that, on the margin, an increase in inconvenience costs starting from 𝑇 reduces the 
attractiveness of the availability strategy, even though that strategy is more 
 
5
 As is clear from Table 2, off-premises Sunday sales hours are generally shorter than on-premises hours. In principle, a 
consumer might also obtain alcohol on Sunday from friends. But anyone attempting to control alcohol consumption through 
the availability strategy would also have an incentive to encourage their friends not to share alcohol with them on Sundays. 
For those unable to control access through friends, the availability strategy is likely ineffective to begin with. 
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attractive when those costs are 𝑇 rather than zero,6 and more attractive when they 
are 𝐵 (that is, prohibitive) rather than 𝑇. Still, in light of this theoretical possibility, 
we investigate whether the effect of a change in off-premise sales hours differs 
according to the length of on-premise sales hours as part of our empirical analysis. 
So far, we have also treated “Sunday” as a single time period. This would be 
appropriate if the desire for alcohol remained constant throughout the entire day. A 
more realistic assumption is that it depends on the consumer’s activities and 
experiences (as discussed in Bernheim and Rangel, 2004), which vary considerably 
over the course of a day. In a more elaborate model, one could represent Sunday as 
a series of time periods (such as “hours”), with separate imperfectly correlated 
realizations of 𝛽 for each. For a consumer using the availability strategy, total 
alcohol consumption would then depend on the number of periods during which 
sales are allowed. Accordingly, in our empirical analysis, we focus primarily on the 
effects of changes in allowable Sunday sales hours, rather than on whether or not a 
state bans Sunday sales entirely.  
D. The effects of a Sunday sales ban on on-premises alcohol sales 
It is important to emphasize that the conclusions highlighted above pertain to off-
premises, rather than on-premises, alcohol consumption. To understand why, 
consider the effects of a change in on-premise sales hours. As a first step, suppose 
the timing of the individual’s trips to bars and restaurants is fixed. An important 
difference between off-premise and on-premise purchases is that alcohol is storable 
in the former context but not in the latter. Assuming that alcohol is complementary 
to restaurant meals and/or social interaction (so that consumption at home is an 
imperfect substitute), a partial or complete ban on Sunday sales will unambiguously 
reduce purchases. Next consider how changes in the timing of trips affect this 
 
6
 When inconvenience costs are zero, the consumer’s payoff is the same regardless of whether or not he purchases alcohol 
at time 0. Therefore, he will refrain from purchasing at time 0 when the inconvenience costs are 𝑇 only if the availability 
strategy delivers a higher payoff with inconvenience costs of 𝑇 than with inconvenience costs of zero. 
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conclusion. A consumer who is time-consistent with respect to alcohol may shift 
his trips away from Sundays to avoid the ban. This response will mute the reduction 
in consumption to some degree, but not entirely, unless he is completely indifferent 
as to timing. A sophisticated time-inconsistent consumer with self-control problems 
may shift his trips to Sundays to take advantage of the ban (thus exposing himself 
to cues that could trigger alcohol consumption only when it is not available). That 
will magnify the reduction in consumption. Finally, a naïve time-inconsistent 
consumer with self-control problems will not adjust the timing of his trips, because 
he expects to refrain from consuming. Thus, regardless of the composition of the 
population, an abbreviation of on-premise Sunday hours should reduce on-premises 
alcohol purchases. 
E. Moving from theory to practice 
Our simple theory assumes that consumers fully reoptimize in response to 
changes in Sunday alcohol sales restrictions. Yet in practice, even sophisticated 
consumers may view the incremental impact of marginal changes in Sunday sales 
hours on overall exposure to temptation as too small to justify reformulating self-
control strategies. More generally, the prevalent self-control strategies may evolve 
slowly as new policies are enacted.  
When considering these possibilities, it is important to recall that, according to 
our model, Sunday off-premises sales restrictions affect alcohol consumption 
through two separate channels, one involving usage of the availability strategy, the 
other involving its efficacy. While a failure to reoptimize would neutralize the 
usage channel, the efficacy channel would remain fully operational. In other words, 
those who chose to employ the availability strategy under the preexisting regime 
would find this strategy less effective on Sundays under a new regime with longer 
sales hours. At a minimum, an empirical study of the relation between alcohol 
consumption and sales hours ought to detect that effect. 
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A corollary of these considerations is that consumers may respond 
asymmetrically depending upon whether Sunday sales hours rise or fall. In a state 
where a Sunday off-premises sales ban has been in place for a long time, consumers 
may have tailored their self-control strategies to exploit it, for example by making 
sure not to stock up on liquor before a weekend. In contrast, in a state where Sunday 
off-premises sales have always been permitted, consumers may have developed 
other self-control techniques. Significantly, the aggregate efficacy effect will be 
higher in the first instance, where usage of the availability strategy is initially more 
widespread, than in the second. This is fortunate from our perspective because, in 
general, states progressively liberalized their Sunday sales restrictions during the 
period we study.    
III. Data 
Characterizing the evolution of each state’s alcohol sales policies from 1970 
through 2007 involved laborious archival research. We began by identifying the 
most recent statutes for each state. Using the amendment dates listed in the notes 
of the current statutes, we then searched for the pre-amended statutes, from which 
we determined the nature of the changes to the alcohol control laws. We collected 
information on the number of allowable hours for both on- and off-premises sales 
as well as the legal drinking age, in all cases noting whether localities were given 
discretion to set either more or less restrictive rules. We supplemented this 
information with data compiled by the Distilled Spirits Council of the United States 
and published in its annual handbooks, which were available for a portion of the 
pertinent time period.   
Stehr (2007) describes the patchwork of state alcohol regulations as Byzantine, 
but even that term understates their variety and complexity. For instance, some 
states prohibit the sale of alcohol unless food is also served; others have 
complicated rules that depend on a county’s population. In many instances we 
found it challenging to characterize these laws along simple measurable 
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dimensions. As a general rule, we measured allowable hours based on the least 
stringent statewide default rule, even if local jurisdictions were granted and 
frequently exercised discretion to deviate from the default. In cases where laws 
provide for contiguous hours of operation after midnight, we associated those hours 
with the previous day; for example, if a state allows sales from 10am on Saturday 
to 2am on Sunday but not otherwise on Sunday, we recorded 16 hours for Saturday 
and zero hours for Sunday. Several states provide no default and leave the 
regulation of hours (either on-premises, off-premises, or both) entirely up to local 
governments; three states did so for part of the period we study. We dropped the 
associated observations from the sample. Ultimately, we arrived at restrictions on 
liquor sales applicable to each state in each year, thereby matching the unit of 
observation for our dependent variable, the volume of liquor sales (see below). This 
necessitated the adoption of a coding convention for policies that were changed 
partway through a year. Our convention was to treat a new law as in effect 
throughout the calendar year in which it was implemented. In Section IVB, we 
show that this convention is not responsible for our findings. 
Between 1970 and 2007, fifteen states repealed blue laws banning off-premises 
liquor sales on Sunday and fourteen states did so for on-premises sales. Including 
these repeals, twenty-one states modified allowable off-premise Sunday sales hours 
a total of thirty-four times, while thirty states modified allowable on-premise 
Sunday sales hours a total of forty-six times. In almost every instance, restrictions 
on Sunday liquor sales were relaxed. All such changes are listed in Table 1.   
Annual state-level data on liquor sales in gallons of pure ethanol equivalent come 
from the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism (NIAAA). Using 
Census Bureau population data, we convert these figures into gallons of pure 
ethanol per person over the age of 18. An obvious limitation of these data is that 
they are highly aggregated, not only across individuals, but also across off-premises 
and on-premises sales. While aggregate data suffice for the purpose of testing the 
hypotheses outlined in Section II, they do not permit us to explore population 
heterogeneity with respect to the demand for and use of commitment devices.  
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Since the NIAAA data describe in-state sales rather than in-state consumption, 
our results necessarily encompass effects on cross-border traffic (see, for example, 
Lovenheim and Slemrod, 2010, on evasion of the legal drinking age). To separate 
cross-border effects from the impact on consumption among a state’s residents, we 
control for differences between the regulations of neighboring states using two sets 
of variables, which we describe below. For numerical illustrations and further 
discussion of these variables, see the appendix. 
The first set of variables is designed to control for the possibility that residents of 
the border counties of neighboring states travel into a state that has laxer laws than 
their own. For each state, we compute the number of allowable Sunday sales hours 
in excess of each of its neighbors (zero if it has shorter hours). We then multiply 
these excess hours by the number of people living in the border counties of the 
neighboring state, and sum over all neighbors to obtain the total number of potential 
person-hours driving inflows of customers (outflows of liquor). Finally, we divide 
by the original state’s population to scale the variable in the same way as our 
dependent variable. We call the resulting variables OnInflows and OffInflows for 
on-premises and off-premises hours, respectively.   
The second set of variables is designed to control for the possibility that the 
state’s residents cross borders to purchase alcohol in other states. For each state, we 
compute excess Sunday sales hours for each of its neighbors (i.e., the difference 
between the neighbor’s hours and the state’s hours, truncated below at zero). We 
then multiply these excess hours by the number of people living in the border 
counties of the subject state, and sum over all neighboring states to obtain the total 
number of potential person-hours driving outflows of customers (inflows of liquor). 
Again we divide by the subject state’s population so that the variables reflect 
comparable scaling. We call these variables OnOutflows and OffOutflows for on-
premise and off-premise hours, respectively. These measures are similar to 
variables used by Stehr (2007), who employs an indicator for a Sunday sales ban 
instead of the difference in hours of sale.   
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Table 2 shows summary statistics. The mean consumption in our sample is nearly 
one gallon of ethanol equivalent per adult per year, though there is substantial 
heterogeneity both within and across states. The unconditional means for on- and 
off-premises Sunday sales hours are 10.0 and 4.9, respectively; conditional on 
positive hours, the means are 15.8 hours and 14.0 hours. Per-capita consumption is 
5.5 percent higher for observations pertaining to states and years for which Sunday 
on-premise sales were allowed, compared with those for which such sales were not 
allowed, and 16 percent higher for observations pertaining to states and years for 
which Sunday off-premise sales were allowed, compared with those for which such 
sales were not allowed. However, these simple comparisons do not account for 
unobserved cross-state variation in attitudes toward alcohol that likely affect both 
Sunday sales restrictions and consumption; nor do they account for other alcohol 
regulations or broader trends. 
IV. Results 
A. Specification 
The unit of observation in our analysis is a state-year. For all the specifications 
reported here, we regress the log of annual per capita ethanol-equivalent liquor sales 
on variables capturing Sunday on-premises and off-premises sales restrictions, state 
fixed effects (to capture differences in attitudes toward alcohol across states), year 
fixed effects (to capture general trends in alcohol consumption, macroeconomic 
activity, and other time-varying factors), and other controls. Thus, our central 
identifying assumption is that there are no systematic differences in unobserved 
factors affecting trends in alcohol consumption between states that do and do not 
change their policies regarding Sunday liquor sales. We employ standard 
diagnostics to evaluate the validity of that identifying assumption below. In all 
cases, the additional controls include variables capturing liquor and cigarette taxes,7 
 
7
The data on taxes were compiled and generously provided by Mark Stehr (see Stehr, 2007). 
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the legal drinking age, provisions allowing local governments to expand or restrict 
Sunday sales hours relative to the statewide default,8 the state’s unemployment rate, 
and the state’s total population. In light of the fact that the specifications include 
state and year fixed effects, the last two variables capture economic and social 
conditions that are distinctive for the state and year in question – for example, they 
allow for the possibility that alcohol consumption rises when economic conditions 
are poor, or follows a different trend in states experiencing rapid population growth.   
Our specifications relate liquor consumption to the number of Sunday hours 
during which sales are allowed. As an alternative, one could examine the 
relationship between consumption and a binary variable indicating whether sales 
are permitted at any point during the day, as in Stehr (2007) for example. In light 
of our study’s objectives, the “hours” specification is preferable under the view, 
expressed in Section IIC, that a lapse of self-control could potentially occur at any 
point during the day. In contrast, the binary specification is more appropriate if 
these potential lapses are concentrated at times of day that always fall within 
allowable sales hours when Sunday sales are permitted. In choosing between the 
“hours” and binary specifications, it is therefore important to ask whether, apart 
from outright bans, the variation in Sunday hours occurs at times when people may 
be tempted to purchase liquor. The following three considerations imply that it 
does. 
First, people drink alcohol throughout the day on Sundays. We can infer this, for 
example, from data on self-administered smartphone breathalyzer tests. Of the tests 
administered during a 24 hour period starting at 6am on the typical Sunday, roughly 
12 percent occur between Sunday 6am and noon, and more than 20 percent occur 
between Sunday noon and 6pm (BACTrac Breahtalyzers, Inc., 2014). While the 
frequency of tests increases over the course of the day, it is important to bear in 
mind that the timing of a BAC test more reliably indicates when a drinking session 
 
8
 Of the fifty-six legislative events that relaxed restrictions on Sunday sales hours (either on- or off-premises), thirteen 
were accompanied by changes in local governments’ discretion to set either more or less restrictive rules. 
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ends than when it begins; accordingly, these data capture alcohol consumption with 
a significant lag. The prevalence of drinking throughout the day on Sundays should 
come as no surprise. Bloody Marys, mimosas, and the like are popular fare at 
Sunday brunches (see, for example, Joseph, 2012). Drinking is also notoriously 
linked to sporting events such as Sunday professional football games, and often 
starts before the events begin (see, for example, the analysis of “tailgating” in Merlo 
et al., 2011).   
Second, regardless of when consumption occurs, events that trigger purchases 
can happen throughout the day. A consumer’s ability to resist the urge to make a 
“liquor run” likely varies over the course of a day with their activities and 
experiences (as discussed in Bernheim and Rangel, 2004). For example, their 
willpower may falter when they anticipate watching a sporting event or getting 
together with friends who drink. Advertisements for alcohol, which are particularly 
common during televised sporting events at all hours of the day, can serve as 
particularly potent cues (Meier, 2011). Thus, every hour of allowable liquor sales 
presents new opportunities for consumers to succumb. Significantly, even if people 
drink more at 6pm than at 11am, a triggering event that occurs at 11am can have a 
larger effect on total consumption over the course of the day by inducing the 
consumer to stock up sooner.   
Third, the observed changes in sales hours do not follow a fixed pattern. In many 
cases states allowed sales earlier in the day, but in some instances they also 
permitted later sales. For example, Pennsylvania extended on-premises hours first 
in one direction and then in the other (1pm to 10pm prior to 1975, 1pm to 2am 
Monday between 1975 and 1984, and 11am to 2am Monday after 1984), while Iowa 
extended on-premises and off-premises hours in both directions at the same points 
in time (12pm to 10pm prior to 1984, 10am to midnight from 1984 to 1991, and 
8am to 2am Monday after 1991).   
Based on these three considerations, we conclude that the variation in Sunday 
sales hours occurs at times of day when people are likely tempted to purchase 
liquor, and consequently that the hours specification is preferable for our purposes. 
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The binary specification disregards relevant variation in liquor sales restrictions and 
inappropriately treats diverse policies as homogenous. 
To interpret the magnitudes of the estimated effects, it is useful to know the 
fractions of total liquor consumption attributable to on-premises and off-premises 
Sunday drinking. To our knowledge, direct estimates of those fractions are not 
available. On the basis of indirect evidence, it appears that on-premises Sunday 
drinking accounts for between 6 and 10 percent of total liquor consumption, while 
off-premises Sunday drinking accounts for between 10 and 14 percent.9 Therefore, 
if an on-premise ban suppressed all on-premise Sunday drinking without causing 
substitution to other days, we would expect total alcohol sales to fall by 6 to 10 
percent; similarly, if an off-premise ban suppressed all off-premise Sunday 
drinking, we would expect total alcohol sales to fall by 10 to 14 percent.  
For all specifications reported below, we cluster standard errors at the state level. 
In the interests of brevity, we report coefficients only for key variables that capture 
aspects of policies targeting alcohol consumption. See the Appendix for complete 
regression results, as well as for estimates of other specifications referenced in the 
text. 
B. Main Results 
Column (1) of Table 3 reports estimates for our main specification. Widening the 
allowable on-premise Sunday sales window by one hour is associated with a 
statistically significant 0.94 percent (s.e. = 0.29 percent) increase in sales. Taking 
 
9
 As a crude estimate of the fraction of liquor consumed on Sundays, one-seventh (14 percent) is conservative because 
people tend to drink more alcohol on weekends than on weekdays (Zegler, 2013). Other evidence suggests that the actual 
figure is in the neighborhood of 20 percent. For example, roughly 18.3 percent of self-administered smartphone breathalyzer 
tests are performed between 6am Sunday morning and 6am Monday morning (BACtrack Breathalyzers, Inc., 2014). In 2000, 
on-premises purchases accounted for 53 percent of household spending on liquor (Paulin, 2003; see also Bloom, 2012, and 
Zegler, 2012). Thus, if the price of liquor were the same on premises and off premises, on-premises Sunday purchases would 
account for about 10.6 percent of total liquor consumption. In fact, liquor is more expensive on premises than off premises. 
If we assume (consistent with some anecdotal evidence and “soft” numbers taken from the popular press) that restaurants 
and bars purchase liquor in bulk at a wholesale discount of 33 percent and sell it with a 300 percent markup over cost, then 
equal spending implies that on-premises liquor sales account for about 30 percent of Sunday consumption, or 6 percent of 
total consumption, while off-premises liquor sales account for about 70 percent of Sunday consumption, or 14 percent of 
total consumption. 
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the linear specification literally, the point estimate implies that allowing twelve 
hours of Sunday on-premises sales increases total liquor consumption by roughly 
11 percent. That estimate is somewhat larger than expected in light of the fact that, 
when allowed, Sunday on-premises sales likely account for less than 10 percent of 
liquor consumption, but a standard confidence interval contains reasonable 
magnitudes. It is also possible that the effect is not perfectly linear, and that much 
of the observed variation in sales hours happens to occur at high-impact times of 
day. 
In contrast, expanding the allowable off-premise Sunday sales window by one 
hour is associated with a small and statistically insignificant 0.08 percent (s.e. = 
0.24 percent) increase in sales. Formally, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the 
effect of off-premises sales hours is zero. The absence of a relationship between 
liquor consumption and allowable off-premises sales hours is inconsistent with the 
notion that significant numbers of consumers use the availability strategy, 
especially because other considerations such as forgetfulness and inventory-
carrying costs would, if anything, tend to augment the estimated effect (as 
explained in Section II).   
An inherent limitation of our approach is that a confidence interval centered at 
zero will always include positive numbers, and hence one cannot hope to reject a 
positive effect in favor of zero. Moreover, given the size of the actual confidence 
interval, we cannot formally reject the hypothesis that a meaningful fraction of 
consumers employ the availability strategy. That said, our failure to reject the 
absence of an off-premises effect is not a matter of imprecision. Rather, it reflects 
the small magnitude of the point estimate. Indeed, as we will see, the point estimates 
for alternative specifications cluster around zero, with some slightly positive and 
some slightly negative. The slightly positive coefficient for this particular 
specification implies that allowing twelve hours of Sunday off-premises sales 
increases total liquor consumption by roughly one percent. To put this figure in 
perspective, recall that if an off-premises ban suppressed all off-premises Sunday 
drinking, we would expect total alcohol sales to fall by 10 to 15 percent. The 
26 
 
contrast between the estimated on-premises and off-premises effects is also striking 
in this regard. We have no difficulty rejecting the hypothesis that the effect of on-
premises sales hours is zero, even though the on-premises coefficient is estimated 
less precisely. Moreover, even though the volume of off-premises liquor sales is 
considerably greater than that of on-premises sales, the difference between the 
estimated off-premises effect and the much larger on-premises effect is statistically 
significant at p = 0.07.   
Other effects in column (1) are also of interest.10 As expected (and consistent 
with the findings in Stehr, 2007), higher taxes on both liquor and cigarettes (which 
are complementary to liquor) reduce liquor consumption, and the effects are 
statistically significant. We are unable to detect a systematic relationship between 
liquor consumption and the legal drinking age despite significant variation in this 
variable prior to the mid-1980s,11 but the estimated effects are imprecise. A local 
option to expand allowable hours relative to the state default increases sales by 1.2 
percent (s.e. = 2.3 percent), and a local option to restrict hours reduces sales by 4.6 
percent (s.e. = 2.3 percent); only the latter effect is statistically significant. 
The size of our data sample is somewhat constrained by the inclusion of controls 
for liquor and cigarette taxes, which we do not have for years before 1981. We use 
these controls to address a potential confound: if legislatures relax Sunday sales 
restrictions with the aim of increasing tax revenues, they may well raise tax rates 
simultaneously. Such occurrences would tend to offset any increase in alcohol sales 
resulting from longer sales hours. That said, dropping these variables allows us to 
add eleven years of data, which offers other potential advantages. Results appear in 
column (2) of Table 3. Our findings do not change appreciably, except that the 
estimated effect of a local option to expand allowable Sunday sales hours is now 
statistically significant. 
 
10
 In addition to the effects discussed in this paragraph, the neighboring state controls are jointly significant (p = 0.006), 
with OffInflows and OnOutflows individually statistically significant, but some of the signs are counterintuitive. 
11
 There were 74 changes in the legal drinking age in our sample, all of which were confined to 24 of the 47 states, with 
21 occurring in 1985 and 1986 in response to federal pressure. 
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In Section II, we observed that the effects of a change in off-premise sales hours 
on the efficacy of the availability strategy, and hence on alcohol purchases, may 
differ according to the length of on-premise sales hours. In particular, the 
implication that those using the availability strategy should increase off-premise 
purchases in response to longer off-premise sales hours follows most cleanly when 
on-premise hours do not exceed off-premise hours. Thus, at least as a matter of 
principle, our failure to detect a significant effect of off-premise hours could be 
attributable to the fact that on-premise hours tend to be longer than off-premise 
hours.12 To test this possibility, we added an interaction term between on-premise 
and off-premise hours to the specification. If lengthening on-premises sales hours 
weakens the effect of limiting off-premise hours, then the coefficient of the 
interaction term should be negative. In fact, as shown in Column (3) of Table 3, 
that coefficient is small, positive, and statistically insignificant; moreover, the 
coefficient of off-premise hours becomes slightly negative. Consequently, we can 
rule out the possibility that the effect of off-premises hours has been muted by 
substitution to on-premises consumption. 
In addition to regulating Sunday sales hours, some states also limit liquor sales 
on Saturdays and weekdays. Yet our basic specification does not include controls 
for non-Sunday restrictions. We formulated the specification this way for three 
reasons.   
First, changes in non-Sunday restrictions were relatively rare, and generally much 
smaller than changes in Sunday restrictions. As a result, we doubted that we would 
be able to measure their effects with useful precision. For example, there were only 
15 changes in maximum on-premises weekday sales hours in our sample, and those 
were confined to 10 states. The change exceeded one hour only seven times, and 
exceeded three hours only three times (those changes being 4, 9, and 11.5 hours). 
In contrast, there were 46 changes in maximum on-premises Sunday sales hours in 
 
12
 Off-premise hours exceeded on-premise hours only in South Dakota. 
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our sample, and those were distributed over 30 states. The change was at least 10 
hours thirteen times, and at least 4 hours twenty times.  
Second, non-Sunday sales restrictions were only modestly correlated with 
Sunday restrictions. Altogether, only 21 percent of changes in Sunday off-premises 
restrictions and 26 percent of changes in Sunday on-premises restrictions also 
affected other days. Allowable hours on weekdays, Fridays, and Saturdays were all 
highly correlated with each other, but they were much less correlated with 
allowable Sunday hours. For example, for allowable on-premises sales hours, 
weekday and Friday restrictions were highly correlated (ρ = 0.998), as were 
weekday and Saturday restrictions (ρ = 0.993), but the correlation between weekday 
and Sunday restrictions was comparatively modest (ρ = 0.271).   
In light of the fact that changes in non-Sunday restrictions were relatively rare, 
small, and only modestly correlated with changes in Sunday restrictions, we 
inferred that the omission of associated controls would likely have a small impact 
on the coefficients of interest. But even if the impact were substantial, we would be 
untroubled, due to our third point: the hypotheses of interest pertain to the effects 
of sales restrictions in general, rather than Sunday restrictions in particular. At 
worst, leaving out controls for non-Sunday restrictions would necessitate a 
reinterpretation of magnitudes. Moreover, given that Sunday and non-Sunday 
changes coincide with similar frequencies for on-premises and off-premises 
restrictions, there is no reason to think that this consideration meaningfully impacts 
comparisons between estimates of their effects. 
In any case, it is certainly possible to estimate specifications that include 
measures of allowable non-Sunday hours; see column (4) of Table 3. Our 
expectations are confirmed: the coefficients of these variables are imprecisely 
estimated, of the wrong sign, and not statistically significant. Notably, the 
coefficient of allowable on-premises Sunday hours is virtually unaffected, while 
that of allowable off-premises hours remains insignificant and becomes slightly 
negative. 
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C. Tests of the Identifying Assumptions 
As mentioned above, our central identifying assumption is that there are no 
systematic differences in unobserved factors affecting trends in alcohol 
consumption between states that do and do not change their policies regarding 
Sunday liquor sales. Thus, a threat to identification arises from the possibility that 
changes in Sunday sales restrictions were correlated with other state-specific 
developments that also influenced alcohol consumption.  
One concern is that causality may flow in the opposite direction: legislators may 
have responded to increasing consumer demand for liquor by relaxing restrictions. 
Notice, however, that this consideration would tend to bias the coefficients of 
interest upward. Consequently, it cannot account for the absence of a significant 
relationship between liquor consumption and off-premises sales hours, which is our 
central finding. Moreover, based on our reading of the historical record, it appears 
more likely that liberalizations of sales hours have been driven primarily by 
orthogonal concerns about tax revenues. Still, the issue merits further investigation. 
A second concern is that relaxations of Sunday sales restrictions may have caused 
public and private organizations to intensify interventions aimed at limiting alcohol 
abuse. Notice that this consideration, unlike the last one, would tend to bias the 
coefficients of interest downward. Thus, it raises the possibility that we might find 
no significant relationship between liquor consumption and Sunday sales hours 
even when one exists. Of course, were this an important confound, we would expect 
it to have similar effects on the estimated coefficients of allowable on-premises and 
off-premises sales hours. In fact, there is no indication that the on-premises 
coefficient is meaningfully attenuated. Still, this concern also merits further 
investigation. 
We address these issues by exploring more carefully the timing of the 
relationships between expanded sales hours and increased alcohol sales. This is an 
effective strategy provided the potentially confounding state-specific changes were 
not precisely synchronized with the policy changes of interest. It is certainly 
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reasonable to assume that, if legislative action resulted from trending liquor 
demand, the trend must have started prior to the legislation, and it likely resulted in 
smooth growth over a period of years rather than a sudden surge in purchases. 
Similarly, if the relaxation of Sunday sales restrictions led to the intensification of 
interventions designed to limit alcohol abuse, those efforts may well have started 
prior to (and in anticipation of) the change, and/or they may have evolved and 
gradually intensified afterwards.   
We began our investigation by adding the one-year leads of allowable on-premise 
and off-premise Sunday sales hours to specification (1) from Table 3; see Column 
(1) of Table 4. If some of the concerns described above are indeed serious, the 
coefficients of the leads should be relatively large, indicating elevated consumption 
prior to the change in the law. Yet those coefficients are quite small and statistically 
insignificant. Notably, the addition of the leads reduces the coefficient for allowable 
on-premises sales hours to a more plausible magnitude. The coefficient for 
allowable off-premise sales hours also falls slightly to 0.0002 percent (s.e. = 0.26 
percent). Including two leads does not change these results appreciably, as seen in 
Column (2) of Table 4. 
Next, we estimated specifications including lags of the key policy variables, 
which could enter with significant coefficients for a variety of reasons: there may 
have been confounding trends in demand, liquor sales may have responded 
gradually to changes in sales hours, liberalization of Sunday sales restrictions may 
have led to progressive intensification of offsetting interventions, the typical law 
may have been implemented partway through the pertinent calendar year (as noted 
in Section III), or consumers may have initially provided for higher liquor 
consumption after the policy change at least in part by drawing down their 
inventories. As shown in Column (3) of Table 4, the coefficients of the lags are 
small and statistically insignificant, and our estimates of the effects of interest are 
largely unchanged. While the measurement of lagged effects does not permit us to 
distinguish between the various possibilities mentioned at the start of this 
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paragraph, there is no indication that any of these considerations are important 
confounds. 
Finally, we estimated specifications that included interactions between a linear 
time trend and two dummy variables, one indicating whether a state ever changed 
off-premise sales restrictions during the sample period, and the other indicating 
whether it ever changed on-premise restrictions. Results appear in Column (4) of 
Table 4. The coefficients of the trend variables are small and statistically 
insignificant, and the main effects of interest remain largely unchanged.13 
Based on these tests, we find strong support for the central identifying assumption 
underlying our analysis.14 We acknowledge that this investigation does not allow 
us to rule out the possibility that changes in Sunday off-premise sales hours led to 
perfectly synchronized and perfectly offsetting adjustments in anti-alcohol 
interventions, but our failure to find clear indications of an attenuated coefficient 
for on-premises sales restrictions (to which the same confound ought to apply) casts 
doubt on this alternative interpretation. In addition, we report below estimates of a 
specification that includes control variables measuring wine and beer consumption, 
which arguably proxy for a wide range of unmeasured factors that may influence 
the general demand for alcohol. While the coefficients of these variables are indeed 
highly significant, their inclusion does not alter the effects of interest. 
D. Additional Robustness Checks 
In light of the fact that we find a sizable effect of cigarette taxation on liquor 
consumption, one possible concern is that we may have controlled inadequately for 
the full range of policies that affect smoking. The most directly pertinent policies 
 
13
 An even more flexible specification would include state-specific linear trends, but this demands a great deal from the 
data and leaves too little variation for identifying the effects of interest. The off-premises coefficients are largely unaffected, 
but (predictably) the on-premises effects become statistically insignificant.  
14
 We also estimated versions of specifications (1) through (3) in Table 4, using dichotomous variables (indicating 
whether or not Sunday sales are allowed at all) rather than measures of allowable hours for the lags and leads. The results 
are extremely similar to those reported in the table. In all cases, the coefficients of allowable off-premises hours are slightly 
negative and statistically insignificant, while those of allowable on-premises hours are large and statistically significant. The 
leads and lags themselves are statistically insignificant. 
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are those pertaining to smoking in places where people tend to consume alcohol. 
Accordingly, we added a dichotomous variable indicating whether state law 
prohibits smoking in bars. Results appear in column (1) of Table 5. The effects of 
bans are statistically insignificant (-0.004, s.e. = 0.026), and the inclusion of this 
variable does not affect our main results. 
Another possible concern is that changes in regulations affecting the sale of liquor 
may have coincided with similar changes affecting wine and beer.15 To the extent 
liquor, wine, and beer are substitutes, such occurrences could potentially confound 
our results. We examine this possibility in two ways. First, we investigate whether 
the inclusion of tax rates for wine and beer affect our conclusions; they do not. As 
seen in Column (2) of Table 5, neither of those tax rates has a statistically significant 
effect on the consumption of liquor, and the coefficients for allowable hours of 
liquor sales are largely unchanged. Second, to control broadly for policies affecting 
wine and beer, we add variables measuring the total consumption of both. As 
mentioned above, those variables also arguably proxy for a wide range of 
unobserved factors generally influencing alcohol consumption. Note that they enter 
with large, statistically significant coefficients. This result is not surprising given 
that unobserved preferences for different types of alcohol are likely positively 
correlated, and that environments favoring the consumption of one type of alcohol 
will also likely favor the consumption of others. Still, the addition of these variables 
has virtually no effect on the coefficients of interest. 
In Section IVA, we explained our reasons for adopting specifications that relate 
liquor consumption to the number of allowable sales hours rather than to binary 
variables indicating whether liquor sales are permitted at some point during the day. 
Recall in particular that binary specifications disregard variation in sales 
restrictions that shed useful light on the hypotheses of interest. At best, they allow 
 
15
 Separately, we also examined whether Sunday sales hours for wine and beer affected wine and beer consumption, but 
the results were inconclusive. As we noted in the introduction, the results for liquor speak most directly and reliably to the 
hypotheses of interest because self-control problems are more prevalent for liquor (Roizen et al. 1999, and Kerr et al., 2002), 
and because our measures of sales restrictions are “noisier” for wine and beer (given that the restrictions themselves are more 
complicated). 
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us to measure the effect of eliminating a Sunday ban, averaged across a relatively 
small number of events wherein bans give way to a heterogeneous assortment of 
restrictions. Significantly, only 21 of the 60 events listed in Table 1 involved the 
elimination of a ban on Sunday sales. Accordingly, binary specifications attempt to 
identify the two effects of interest based on barely more than one-third of the events 
that provide identification in the “hours” specifications – that is, from roughly 10 
events per effect.   
Because binary specifications are both conceptually flawed for our purposes and 
severely underpowered, we place little stock in them. However, to facilitate 
comparisons with some related studies, we nevertheless report one in column (4) 
of Table 5. Notably, the estimated coefficients for on-premises and off-premises 
restrictions imply a combined effect comparable to that reported in Stehr (2007). 
However, compared with our other estimates, there is a striking (and anticipated) 
loss of precision. From one perspective, the results are qualitatively similar: the 
effect of an on-premises ban is large and statistically significant, while that of an 
off-premises ban is smaller and statistically insignificant. However, from another 
perspective, the cost of discarding two-thirds of the relevant variation in sales 
restrictions is readily evident. In this instance, our failure to reject the absence of 
an off-premises effect results from the large standard error rather than the 
magnitude of the pertinent coefficient, which, though still noticeably smaller than 
its on-premises counterpart, is consistent with a reasonably large impact on alcohol 
sales. In addition, we can no longer reject equality of the on-premises and off-
premises effects.   
It is important to emphasize that the inconclusiveness of results based on binary 
specifications does not undermine our main findings. With our data and the policy 
changes that are observed therein, an analysis confined to removing absolute bans 
provides a low-powered test. For the reasons discussed earlier in this section, this 
low power is not surprising given the nature of the policy changes and the response 
of households to them. Once one also exploits highly relevant variation in allowable 
sales hours, the data speak to those hypotheses with reasonable clarity.  
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V. Conclusions 
Taken as a whole, our results indicate that consumers increase their liquor 
consumption in response to extended Sunday on-premise sales hours, but not in 
response to extended off-premise sales hours. While our analysis uncovers no 
indication that off-premise sales hours affect alcohol purchases, it does not prove 
that such an effect is absent. As always, it is impossible to reject the hypothesis that 
an effect is nonzero. Still, in all specifications the pertinent coefficients cluster near 
zero, and consequently we fail to reject the hypothesis that the demand for 
commitment via the availability strategy is absent. Most strikingly, we fail to detect 
an effect of off-premise sales hours even though we easily detect a strong effect for 
on-premise sales hours. That disparity is at odds with the hypothesis that the 
demand for commitment via the availability strategy is prevalent. 
Thus, to our considerable surprise, we find no indication that commitment 
strategies affecting availability play meaningful roles in aggregate liquor 
consumption. Instead, the observed pattern coincides with predictions for time-
consistent or naively time-inconsistent consumers who have reasonably good 
memories and low costs of carrying inventories. Though the aggregated nature of 
the available data on liquor consumption precludes us from exploring population 
heterogeneity with respect to the demand for and use of commitment devices, we 
can nevertheless infer that use of the availability strategy is likely not widespread. 
Our findings also have important implications concerning tax policy and public 
health. Measures that relax restrictions pertaining to on-premise liquor sales are 
likely to increase state tax revenue, but may also entail greater alcohol-related social 
costs. However, measures that relax restrictions pertaining to off-premise liquor 
sales are unlikely to have either effect. 
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TABLE 1: CHANGES IN HOURS OF SALE 
State Year On- or Off-Premises Original Hours New Hours 
Arizona 1986 Both 13 15 
Arizona 2004 Both 15 16 
Arkansas 1999 Both 0 10 
Colorado 1997 On 12 19 
Connecticut 1993 On 0 15 
District of Columbia 2004 On 17 16 
Florida 1972 Both 0 17 
Indiana 2004 On 0 10 
Iowa 1974 Both 0 10 
Iowa 1984 Both 10 14 
Iowa 1991 Both 14 18 
Kansas 1986 On 0 17 
Maine 1976 On 0 13 
Maine 1991 Off 0 5 
Maine 1993 Off 5 13 
Maine 1995 Both 13 16 
Massachusetts 2004 Off 0 12 
Massachusetts 2004 On 0 13 
Michigan 1976 Both 10 12 
Michigan 2004 Both 12 14 
Missouri 1986 On 0 12 
Missouri 1993 Off 0 11 
Missouri 1993 On 12 13 
Missouri 1994 Off 11 13 
Missouri 2001 Both 13 15 
Missouri 2004 Both 15 19.5 
Montana 1975 Both 13 18 
Nebraska 1991 Both 0 13 
New Hampshire 1994 Off 14.75 17.75 
New Hampshire 1994 On 16 19 
New Mexico 1995 Off 0 12 
New York 1976 On 14 16 
North Carolina 1971 On 10.75 13 
North Carolina 1993 On 13 14 
North Dakota 1993 Both 0 13 
North Dakota 2004 Both 13 14 
Ohio 2001 On 11 14 
Oregon 2002 Off 0 15 
Pennsylvania 1975 On 9 13 
Pennsylvania 1984 On 13 15 
Pennsylvania 2002 Off 0 5 
Rhode Island 2004 Off 0 6 
South Dakota 1989 Off 0 17 
South Dakota 1991 On 11 13 
South Dakota 2004 On 13 15 
Texas 1993 On 12 14 
Utah 1985 On 12 11 
Utah 1993 On 11 12 
Utah 2004 On 12 15 
Vermont 1973 Off 9 14 
Vermont 2001 Off 14 18 
Vermont 2001 On 16 18 
Virginia 2004 Off 0 11 
Washington 1976 On 12 20 
West Virginia 1983 On 0 11 
West Virginia 1986 On 11 13 
West Virginia 2004 On 13 14 
Wisconsin 1988 On 17.5 20 
Wyoming 1973 Both 7 10 
Wyoming 1996 Both 10 20 
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TABLE 2: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Variable Description Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Sales Per-capita distilled spirits sale(gallons of ethanol equivalent) 0.972 0.472 
LogSales Log of ethanol-equivalent sales -0.111 0.384 
AllowSundayOnPremises 1 if the state allows on-premises Sunday sales 0.657 0.475 
AllowSundayOffPremises 1 if the state allows off-premises Sunday sales 0.334 0.468 
SundayOnHours Number of on-premises Sunday sales hours 10.0 7.70 
SundayOffHours Number of off-premises Sunday sales hours 4.89 7.25 
UnemploymentRate State-level unemployment rate 5.88 2.01 
PopOver18 State population over 18 years of age in millions 3.69 4.16 
LegalAge18 1 if the state drinking age is 18 in that year.  0.083 0.272 
LegalAge19 1 if the state drinking age is 19 in that year.  0.076 0.258 
LegalAge20 1 if the state drinking age is 20 in that year.  0.031 0.162 
LegalAge21 1 if the state drinking age is 21 in that year.  0.811 0.389 
Expand 
Local option to expand on- or off-premises Sunday hours from 
the default. 
0.501 0.500 
Restrict 
Local option to restrict on- or off-premises Sunday hours from 
the default. 
0.426 0.496 
OnInflows 
Number of on-premises sale hours in excess of neighbor 
states, weighted by neighbor state border county population 
over own state population 
2.66 7.74 
OffInflows 
Number of off-premises sale hours in excess of neighbor 
states, weighted by neighbor state border county population 
over own state population 
2.08 7.05 
OnOutflows 
Number of on-premises sale hours less than neighbor states, 
weighted by own state border county population over own 
state population 
3.21 7.59 
OffOutflows 
Number of off-premises sale hours less than neighbor states, 
weighted by own state border county population over own 
state population 
2.71 6.06 
Notes: This table reports means and standard deviations for 1722 observations across 47 states that had a state 
default for both on- and off-premises hours of sale for at least one year.  
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TABLE 3: MAIN RESULTS 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
SundayOnHours 
0.0094*** 
(0.0029) 
0.0116** 
(0.0035) 
0.0093*** 
(0.0029) 
0.0099*** 
(0.0032) 
SundayOffHours 
0.0008 
(0.0024) 
0.0012 
(0.0025) 
-0.0051 
(0.0049) 
-0.0011 
(0.0026) 
SundayOnHours x SundayOffHours - - 
0.0004 
(0.0003) 
- 
NonSundayAverageOnHours - - 
- -0.0033 
(0.0058) 
NonSundayAverageOffHours - - 
- -0.0107 
(0.0071) 
Liquor Tax  
(log of real dollars per gallon) 
-0.0321** 
(0.0152) 
- 
-0.0508** 
(0.0229) 
-0.0293* 
(0.0157) 
Cigarette Tax 
(log of real dollars per pack) 
-0.0278** 
(0.0125) 
- 
-0.0281** 
(0.0122) 
-0.0235* 
(0.0131) 
LegalAge18 
0.0700 
(0.0743) 
0.0482 
(0.0397) 
0.0754 
(0.0716) 
0.0473 
(0.0818) 
LegalAge19 
-0.0346 
(0.0204) 
-0.0057 
(0.0235) 
-0.0290 
(0.0209) 
-0.0378* 
(0.0220) 
LegalAge20 
-0.0185 
(0.0219) 
-0.0381 
(0.0226) 
-0.0152 
(0.0225) 
-0.0324 
(0.0253) 
Expand 
0.0120 
(0.0203) 
0.0483** 
(0.0218) 
0.0083 
(0.0200) 
0.0096 
(0.0194) 
Restrict 
-0.0458** 
(0.0231) 
-0.0640** 
(0.0232) 
-0.0393 
(0.0242) 
-0.0334 
(0.0216) 
N 1196 1722 1196 1050 
Notes: Coefficients are reported for OLS models with the log of per-capita alcohol sales as the dependent variable. 
Each regression also includes state and year fixed effects, controls for restrictions on liquor sales hours in 
neighboring states, the state’s unemployment rate, and the state’s total population. Standard errors clustered at 
the state level are in parentheses; those significant at the 10 percent level are marked with * and those significant 
at the 5 percent level are marked with **. Column (1) is our basic specification. Column (2) drops the liquor tax 
and cigarette tax variables in order to expand the sample. Column (3) adds an interaction between allowable on-
premises and off-premises hours to the basic specification in order to investigate a possibility described in Section 
IIC. Column (4) supplements the basic specification with measures of allowable alcohol sales hours on days other 
than Sunday. 
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TABLE 4: TESTS OF THE IDENTIFYING ASSUMPTIONS 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
SundayOnHours 
0.0077*** 
(0.0025) 
0.0071*** 
(0.0023) 
0.0066** 
(0.0027) 
0.0087*** 
(0.0029) 
SundayOffHours 
0.0002 
(0.0026) 
0.0008 
(0.0025) 
-0.0004 
(0.0024) 
0.0009 
(0.0030) 
SundayOnHours – Lead 
0.0014 
(0.0017) 
-0.0010 
(0.0025) 
- - 
SundayOffHours – Lead 
0.0009 
(0.0019) 
-0.0010 
(0.0021) 
- - 
SundayOnHours – Two Leads - 
0.0029 
(0.0031) 
- - 
SundayOffHours – Two Leads - 
0.0019 
(0.0027) 
- - 
SundayOnHours – Lag - - 
-0.0003 
(0.0009) 
- 
SundayOffHours – Lag - - 
-0.0004 
(0.0011) 
- 
SundayOnHours – Two Lags - - 
0.0018 
(0.0021) 
- 
SundayOffHours – Two Lags - - 
0.0020 
(0.0018) 
- 
EverOnChange x Trend - - - 
0.0011 
(0.0019) 
EverOffChange x Trend - - - 
0.0011 
(0.0021) 
N 1149 1102 1104 1196 
Notes: Coefficients are reported from OLS models with the log of per-capita alcohol sales as the dependent 
variable. Each regression also includes a set of indicators for the state’s legal drinking age, indicators for whether 
local jurisdictions can expand or restrict hours of sale, unemployment rate, population, neighboring state controls, 
the log of liquor and cigarette taxes, and state and year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the state level 
are in parentheses; those significant at the 10 percent level are marked with * and those significant at the 5 percent 
level are marked with **. Column (1) supplements the basic specification with leads for the key policy variables; 
column (2) adds a second lead. Column (3) supplements the basic specification with two lags. Column (4) adds 
separate trends for states that did and did not change their Sunday restrictions during the sample period. 
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TABLE 5: ADDITIONAL ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
SundayOnHours 
0.0095*** 
(0.0028) 
0.0095*** 
(0.0028) 
0.0089*** 
(0.0028) 
- 
SundayOffHours 
0.0008 
(0.0024) 
0.0008 
(0.0023) 
0.0003 
(0.0024) 
- 
AllowsSundayOn - - 
- 0.0805** 
(0.0366) 
AllowsSundayOff - - 
- 0.0367 
(0.0297) 
Ban on Smoking in Bars 
0.0038 
(0.0259) 
- - - 
Wine Tax  
(log of real dollars per gallon) 
- 
0.0032 
(0.0200) 
- - 
Beer Tax  
(log of real dollars per gallon) 
- 
0.0595 
(0.0738) 
- - 
Log of Beer Consumption - - 
0.324*** 
(0.0890) 
- 
Log of Wine Consumption - - 
0.104** 
(0.0397) 
- 
N 1196 1196 1196 1196 
Notes: Coefficients are reported from OLS models with the log of per-capita alcohol sales as the dependent 
variable. Each regression also includes a set of indicators for the state’s legal drinking age, indicators for whether 
local jurisdictions can expand or restrict hours of sale, unemployment rate, population, neighboring state controls, 
the log of liquor and cigarette taxes, and state and year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the state level 
are in parentheses; those significant at the 10 percent level are marked with * and those significant at the 5 percent 
level are marked with **. Columns (1) through (3) supplement the basic specification with variables measuring, 
respectively, whether smoking was allowed in bars, the tax rates on wine and beer, and the total amount of beer 
and wine consumption. Column (4) replaces our measures of allowable Sunday sales hours with dichotomous 
variables indicating whether any Sunday sales were permitted. 
